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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in
two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by play-
ing against itself without any direct supervision. In a tabular episodic Markov game with S states, A
max-player actions and B min-player actions, the best existing algorithm for finding an approximate
Nash equilibrium requires O˜(S2AB) steps of game playing, when only highlighting the dependency on
(S,A,B). In contrast, the best existing lower bound scales as Ω(S(A + B)) and has a significant gap
from the upper bound. This paper closes this gap for the first time: we propose an optimistic variant of
the Nash Q-learning algorithm with sample complexity O˜(SAB), and a new Nash V-learning algorithm
with sample complexity O˜(S(A+B)). The latter result matches the information-theoretic lower bound
in all problem-dependent parameters except for a polynomial factor of the length of each episode.
Towards understanding learning objectives in Markov games other than finding the Nash equilibrium,
we present a computational hardness result for learning the best responses against a fixed opponent. This
also implies the computational hardness for achieving sublinear regret when playing against adversarial
opponents.
1 Introduction
Awide range of modern artificial intelligence challenges can be cast as a multi-agent reinforcement learning
(multi-agent RL) problem, in which more than one agent performs sequential decision making in an interac-
tive environment. Multi-agent RL has achieved significant recent success on traditionally challenging tasks,
for example in the game of GO [29, 30], Poker [6], real-time strategy games [32, 22], decentralized controls
or multiagent robotics systems [5], autonomous driving [26], as well as complex social scenarios such as
hide-and-seek [3]. In many scenarios, the learning agents even outperform the best human experts .
Despite the great empirical success, a major bottleneck for many existing RL algorithms is that they
require a tremendous number of samples. For example, the biggest AlphaGo Zero model is trained on tens
of millions of games and took more than a month to train [30]. While requiring such amount of samples
may be acceptable in simulatable environments such as GO, it is not so in other sample-expensive real
world settings such as robotics and autonomous driving. It is thus important for us to understand the sample
complexity in RL—how can we design algorithms that find a near optimal policy with a small number of
samples, and what is the fundamental limit, i.e. the minimum number of samples required for any algorithm
to find a good policy.
Theoretical understandings on the sample complexity for multi-agent RL are rather limited, especially
when compared with single-agent settings. The standard model for a single-agent setting is an episodic
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Markov Decision Process (MDP) with S states, and A actions, and H steps per episode. The best known
algorithm can find an ǫ near-optimal policy in Θ˜(poly(H)SA/ǫ2) episodes, which matches the lower bound
up to a single H factor [1, 8]. In contrast, in multi-agent settings, the optimal sample complexity remains
open even in the basic setting of two-player tabular Markov games [27], where the agents are required to
find the solutions of the games—the Nash equilibria. The best known algorithm, VI-ULCB, finds an ǫ-
approximate Nash equilibrium in O˜(poly(H)S2AB/ǫ2) episodes [2], where B is the number of actions for
the other player. The information theoretical lower bound is Ω(poly(H)S(A + B)/ǫ2). Specifically, the
number of episodes required for the algorithm scales quadratically in both S and (A,B), and exhibits a gap
from the linear dependency in the lower bound. This motivates the following question:
Can we design algorithms with near-optimal sample complexity for learning Markov games?
In this paper, we present the first line of near-optimal algorithms for two-player Markov games that match
the aforementioned lower bound up to a poly(H) factor. This closes the open problem for achieving the
optimal sample complexity in all (S,A,B) dependency. Our algorithm learns by playing against itself
without requiring any direct supervision, and is thus a self-play algorithm.
1.1 Our contributions
• We propose an optimistic variant of Nash Q-learning [11], and prove that it achieves sample complexity
O˜(H5SAB/ǫ2) for finding an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player Markov games (Section 3).
Our algorithm builds optimistic upper and lower estimates of Q-values, and computes the Coarse Corre-
lated Equilibrium (CCE) over this pair of Q estimates as its execution policies for both players.
• We design a new algorithm—Nash V-learning—for finding approximate Nash equilibria, and show that
it achieves sample complexity O˜(H6S(A + B)/ǫ2) (Section 4). This improves upon Nash Q-learning
in case min {A,B} > H . It is also the first result that matches the minimax lower bound up to only
a poly(H) factor. This algorithm builds optimistic upper and lower estimates of V -values, and features
a novel combination of Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) and standard Q-learning algorithm to
determine its execution policies.
• Apart from finding Nash equilibria, we prove that learning the best responses of fixed opponents in
Markov games is as hard as learning parity with noise—a notoriously difficult problem that is believed to
be computationally hard (Section 5). This hardness result directly implies that achieving sublinear regret
against adversarial opponents in Markov games is also computationally hard, which in turn rules out the
possibility of designing efficient algorithms for finding Nash equilibria by running no-regret algorithms
for each player separately.
In addition to above contributions, this paper also features a novel approach of extracting certified policies—
from the estimates produced by reinforcement learning algorithms such as Nash Q-learning and Nash V-
learning—that are certified to have similar performance as Nash equilibrium policies, even when facing
against their best response (see Section 3 for more details). We believe this technique could be of broader
interest to the community.
1.2 Related Work
Markov games Markov games (or stochastic games) are proposed in the early 1950s [27]. They are
widely used to model multi-agent RL. Learning the Nash equilibria of Markov games has been studied in
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Table 1: Sample complexity (the required number of episodes) for algorithms to find ǫ-approximate Nash
equlibrium policies in zero-sum Markov games.
Algorithm Sample Complexity Runtime
VI-ULCB [2] O˜(H4S2AB/ǫ2) PPAD-complete
VI-explore [2] O˜(H5S2AB/ǫ2)
Polynomial
OMVI-SM [35] O˜(H4S3A3B3/ǫ2)
Optimistic Nash Q-learning O˜(H5SAB/ǫ2)
Optimistic Nash V-learning O˜(H6S(A+B)/ǫ2)
Lower Bound [14, 2] Ω(H3S(A+B)/ǫ2) -
classical work [18, 19, 11, 10], where the transition matrix and reward are assumed to be known, or in the
asymptotic setting where the number of data goes to infinity. These results do not directly apply to the
non-asymptotic setting where the transition and reward are unknown and only a limited amount of data are
available for estimating them.
A recent line of work tackles self-play algorithms for Markov games in the non-asymptotic setting
with strong reachability assumptions. Specifically, Wei et al. [34] assumes no matter what strategy one
agent sticks to, the other agent can always reach all states by playing a certain policy, and Jia et al. [13],
Sidford et al. [28] assume access to simulators (or generative models) that enable the agent to directly
sample transition and reward information for any state-action pair. These settings ensure that all states can
be reached directly, so no sophisticated exploration is not required.
Very recently, [2, 35] study learning Markov games without these reachability assumptions, where ex-
ploration becomes essential. However, both results suffer from highly suboptimal sample complexity. We
compare them with our results in Table 1. The results of [35] also applies to the linear function approxima-
tion setting. We remark that the R-max algorithm [4] does provide provable guarantees for learning Markov
game, even in the setting of playing against the adversarial opponent, but using a definition of regret that is
weaker than the standard regret. Their result does not imply any sample complexity result for finding Nash
equilibrium policies.
Adversarial MDP Another line of related work focuses on provably efficient algorithms for adversarial
MDPs. Most work in this line considers the setting with adversarial rewards [37, 25, 15], because adversarial
MDP with changing dynamics is computationally hard even under full-information feedback [36]. These
results do not directly imply provable self-play algorithms in our setting, because the opponent in Markov
games can affect both the reward and the transition.
Single-agent RL There is a rich literature on reinforcement learning in MDPs [see e.g. 12, 24, 1, 7, 31, 14].
MDP is a special case of Markov games, where only a single agent interacts with a stochastic environment.
For the tabular episodic setting with nonstationary dynamics and no simulators, the best sample complexity
achieved by existing model-based and model-free algorithms are O˜(H3SA/ǫ2) [1] and O˜(H4SA/ǫ2) [14],
respectively, where S is the number of states, A is the number of actions, H is the length of each episode.
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Both of them (nearly) match the lower bound Ω(H3SA/ǫ2) [12, 23, 14].
2 Preliminaries
We consider zero-sum Markov Games (MG) [27, 18], which are also known as stochastic games in the
literature. Zero-sum Markov games are generalization of standard Markov Decision Processes (MDP) into
the two-player setting, in which the max-player seeks to maximize the total return and the min-player seeks
to minimize the total return.
Formally, we denote a tabular episodic Markov game as MG(H,S,A,B,P, r), where H is the number
of steps in each episode, S is the set of states with |S| ≤ S, (A,B) are the sets of actions of the max-player
and the min-player respectively, P = {Ph}h∈[H] is a collection of transition matrices, so that Ph(·|s, a, b)
gives the distribution over states if action pair (a, b) is taken for state s at step h, and r = {rh}h∈[H] is a
collection of reward functions, and rh : S ×A×B → [0, 1] is the deterministic reward function at step h. 1
In each episode of this MG, we start with a fixed initial state s1. Then, at each step h ∈ [H], both
players observe state sh ∈ S , and the max-player picks action ah ∈ A while the min-player picks action
bh ∈ B simultaneously. Both players observe the actions of the opponents, receive reward rh(sh, ah, bh),
and then the environment transitions to the next state sh+1 ∼ Ph(·|sh, ah, bh). The episode ends when sH+1
is reached.
Markov policy, value function A Markov policy µ of the max-player is a collection of H functions
{µh : S → ∆A}h∈[H], which maps from a state to a distribution of actions. Here ∆A is the probability
simplex over action set A. Similarly, a policy ν of the min-player is a collection of H functions {νh : S →
∆B}h∈[H]. We use the notation µh(a|s) and νh(b|s) to present the probability of taking action a or b for
state s at step h under Markov policy µ or ν respectively.
We use V µ,νh : S → R to denote the value function at step h under policy µ and ν, so that V µ,νh (s) gives
the expected cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from s at step h:
V µ,νh (s) := Eµ,ν
[∑H
h′=h rh′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
∣∣∣ sh = s] . (1)
We also define Qµ,νh : S × A × B → R to denote Q-value function at step h so that Qµ,νh (s, a, b) gives the
cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from (s, a, b) at step h:
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) := Eµ,ν
[∑H
h′=h rh′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
∣∣∣ sh = s, ah = a, bh = b] . (2)
For simplicity, we use notation of operator Ph so that [PhV ](s, a, b) := Es′∼Ph(·|s,a,b)V (s
′) for any value
function V . We also use notation [DπQ](s) := E(a,b)∼π(·,·|s)Q(s, a, b) for any action-value function Q. By
definition of value functions, we have the Bellman equation
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
µ,ν
h+1)(s, a, b), V
µ,ν
h (s) = (Dµh×νhQ
µ,ν
h )(s)
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H]. We define V µ,νH+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ SH+1.
1We assume the rewards in [0, 1] for normalization. Our results directly generalize to randomized reward functions, since
learning the transition is more difficult than learning the reward.
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Best response and Nash equilibrium For any Markov policy of the max-player µ, there exists a best
response of the min-player, which is a Markov policy ν†(µ) satisfying V µ,ν
†(µ)
h (s) = infν V
µ,ν
h (s) for any
(s, h) ∈ S × [H]. Here the infimum is taken over all possible policies which are not necessarily Markovian
(we will define later in this section). We define V µ,†h := V
µ,ν†(µ)
h . By symmetry, we can also define µ
†(ν)
and V †,νh . It is further known (cf. [9]) that there exist Markov policies µ
⋆, ν⋆ that are optimal against the
best responses of the opponents, in the sense that
V µ
⋆,†
h (s) = supµ V
µ,†
h (s), V
†,ν⋆
h (s) = infν V
†,ν
h (s), for all (s, h).
We call these optimal strategies (µ⋆, ν⋆) the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game, which satisfies the
following minimax equation: 2
supµ infν V
µ,ν
h (s) = V
µ⋆,ν⋆
h (s) = infν supµ V
µ,ν
h (s).
Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium gives a solution in which no player has anything to gain by changing only her
own policy. We further abbreviate the values of Nash equilibrium V µ
⋆,ν⋆
h andQ
µ⋆,ν⋆
h as V
⋆
h andQ
⋆
h. We refer
readers to Appendix A for Bellman optimality equations for values of best responses or Nash equilibria.
General (non-Markovian) policy In certain situations, it is beneficial to consider general, history-dependent
policies that are not necessarily Markovian. A (general) policy µ of the max-player is a set of H maps
µ :=
{
µh : R × (S × A × B × R)h−1 × S → ∆A
}
h∈[H], from a random number z ∈ R and a history of
length h—say (s1, a1, b1, r1, · · · , sh), to a distribution over actions in A. By symmetry, we can also define
the (general) policy ν of the min-player, by replacing the action setA in the definition by set B. The random
number z is sampled from some underlying distribution D, but may be shared among all steps h ∈ [H].
For a pair of general policy (µ, ν), we can still use the same definitions (1) to define their value V µ,ν1 (s1)
at step 1. We can also define the best response ν†(µ) of a general policy µ as the minimizing policy so that
V µ,†1 (s1) ≡ V µ,ν
†(µ)
1 (s1) = infν V
µ,ν
h (s1) at step 1. We remark that the best response of a general policy is
not necessarily Markovian.
Learning Objective There are two possible learning objectives in the setting of Markov games. The first
one is to find the best response for a fixed opponent. Without loss of generality, we consider the case where
the learning agent is the max-player, and the min-player is the opponent.
Definition 1 (ǫ-approximate best response). For an opponent with an fixed unknown general policy ν, a
general policy µˆ is the ǫ-approximate best response if V †,ν1 (s1)− V µˆ,ν1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
The second goal is to find a Nash equilibrium of the Markov games. We measure the suboptimality
of any pair of general policies (µˆ, νˆ) using the gap between their performance and the performance of the
optimal strategy (i.e. Nash equilibrium) when playing against the best responses respectively:
V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) =
[
V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V ⋆1 (s1)
]
+
[
V ⋆1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1)
]
Definition 2 (ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium). A pair of general policies (µˆ, νˆ) is an ǫ-approximate Nash
equilibrium, if V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
2The minimax theorem here is different from the one for matrix games, i.e. maxφminψ φ
⊤Aψ = minψ maxφ φ
⊤Aψ for any
matrix A, since here V
µ,ν
h (s) is in general not bilinear in µ, ν.
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Algorithm 1 Optimistic Nash Q-learning
1: Initialize: for any (s, a, b, h), Qh(s, a, b)← H , Qh(s, a, b)← 0, Nh(s, a, b)← 0,
πh(a, b|s)← 1/(AB).
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: receive s1.
4: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
5: take action (ah, bh) ∼ πh(·, ·|sh).
6: observe reward rh(sh, ah, bh) and next state sh+1.
7: t = Nh(sh, ah, bh)← Nh(sh, ah, bh) + 1.
8: Qh(sh, ah, bh)← (1− αt)Qh(sh, ah, bh) + αt(rh(sh, ah, bh) + V h+1(sh+1) + βt)
9: Q
h
(sh, ah, bh)← (1− αt)Qh(sh, ah, bh) + αt(rh(sh, ah, bh) + V h+1(sh+1)− βt)
10: πh(·, ·|sh)← CCE(Qh(sh, ·, ·), Qh(sh, ·, ·))
11: V h(sh)← (DπhQh)(sh); V h(sh)← (DπhQh)(sh).
Loosely speaking, Nash equilibria can be viewed as “the best responses to the best responses”. In most
applications, they are the ultimate solutions to the games. In Section 3 and 4, we present sharp guarantees
for learning an approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal sample complexity. However, rather sur-
prisingly, learning a best response in the worst case is more challenging than learning the Nash equilibrium.
In Section 5, we present a computational hardness result for learning an approximate best response.
3 Optimistic Nash Q-learning
In this section, we present our first algorithm Optimistic Nash Q-learning and its corresponding theoretical
guarantees.
Algorithm part I: learning values Our algorithm Optimistic Nash Q-learning (Algorithm 1) is an opti-
mistic variant of Nash Q-learning [11]. For each step in each episode, it (a) takes actions according to the
previously computed policy πh, and observes the reward and next state, (b) performs incremental updates
on Q-values, and (c) computes new greedy policies and updates V -values. Part (a) is straightforward; we
now focus on explaining part (b) and part (c).
In part (b), the incremental updates on Q-values (Line 8, 9) are almost the same as standard Q-learning
[33], except here we maintain two separate Q-values—Qh and Qh, as upper and lower confidence versions
respectively. We add and subtract a bonus term βt in the corresponding updates, which depends on t =
Nh(sh, ah, bh)—the number of times (sh, ah, bh) has been visited at step h. We pick parameter αt and βt
as follows for some large constant c , and log factors ι:
αt = (H + 1)/(H + t), βt = c
√
H3ι/t (3)
In part (c), our greedy policies are computed using a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) subroutine,
which is first introduced by [35] to solve Markov games using value iteration algorithms. For any pair of
matrices Q,Q ∈ [0,H]A×B , CCE(Q,Q) returns a distribution π ∈ ∆A×B such that
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≥max
a⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a⋆, b) (4)
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≤min
b⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b⋆)
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Algorithm 2 Certified Policy µˆ of Nash Q-learning
1: sample k ← Uniform([K]).
2: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
3: observe sh, and take action ah ∼ µkh(·|sh).
4: observe bh, and set t← Nkh (sh, ah, bh).
5: sample m ∈ [t] with P(m = i) = αit.
6: k ← kmh (sh, ah, bh)
It can be shown that a CCE always exists, and it can be computed by linear programming in polynomial
time (see Appendix B for more details).
Now we are ready to state an intermediate guarantee for optimistic Nash Q-learning. We assume the
algorithm has played the game for K episodes, and we use V k, Qk, Nk, πk to denote values, visitation
counts, and policies at the beginning of the k-th episode in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3. For any p ∈ (0, 1], choose hyperparameters αt, βt as in (3) for a large absolute constant c and
ι = log(SABT/p). Then, with probability at least 1− p, Algorithm 1 has following guarantees
• V kh(s) ≥ V ⋆h (s) ≥ V kh(s) for all (s, h, k) ∈ S × [H]× [K].
• (1/K) ·∑Kk=1(V k1 − V k1)(s1) ≤ O(√H5SABι/K).
Lemma 3 makes two statements. First, it claims that the V
k
h(s) and V
k
h(s) computed in Algorithm 1
are indeed upper and lower bounds of the value of the Nash equilibrium. Second, Lemma 3 claims that the
averages of the upper bounds and the lower bounds are also very close to the value of Nash equilibrium
V ⋆1 (s1), where the gap decrease as 1/
√
K . This implies that in order to learn the value V ⋆1 (s1) up to
ǫ-accuracy, we only need O(H5SABι/ǫ2) episodes.
However, Lemma 3 has a significant drawback: it only guarantees the learning of the value of Nash
equilibrium. It does not imply that the policies (µk, νk) used in Algorithm 1 are close to the Nash equilib-
rium, which requires the policies to have a near-optimal performance even against their best responses. This
is a major difference between Markov games and standard MDPs, and is the reason why standard techniques
from the MDP literature does not apply here. To resolve this problem, we propose a novel way to extract a
certified policy from the optimistic Nash Q-learning algorithm.
Algorithm part II: certified policies We describe our procedure of executing the certified policy µˆ of the
max-player is described in Algorithm 2. Above, µkh, ν
k
h denote the marginal distributions of π
k
h produced
in Algorithm 1 over action set A,B respectively. We also introduce the following quantities that directly
induced by αt:
α0t :=
∏t
j=1 (1− αj), αit := αi
∏t
j=i+1 (1− αj) (5)
whose properties are listed in the following Lemma 11. Especially,
∑t
i=1 α
i
t = 1, so {αit}ti=1 defines a
distribution over [t]. We use kmh (s, a, b) to denote the index of the episode where (s, a, b) is observed in step
h for the m-th time. The certified policy νˆ of the min-player is easily defined by symmetry. We note that
µˆ, νˆ are clearly general policies, but they are no longer Markov policies.
The intuitive reason why such policy µˆ defined in Algorithm 2 is certified by Nash Q-learning algorithm,
is because the update equation in line 8 of Algorithm 1 and equation (5) gives relation:
Q
k
h(s, a, b) = α
0
tH +
∑t
i=1 α
i
t
[
rh(s, a, b) + V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1) + βi
]
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This certifies the good performance against the best responses if the max-player plays a mixture of policies
{µkih+1}ti=1 at step h+ 1 with mixing weights {αit}ti=1 (see Appendix C.2 for more details). A recursion of
this argument leads to the certified policy µˆ—a nested mixture of policies.
We now present our main result for Nash Q-learning, using the certified policies (µˆ, νˆ).
Theorem 4 (Sample Complexity of Nash Q-learning). For any p ∈ (0, 1], choose hyperparameters αt, βt
as in (3) for large absolute constant c and ι = log(SABT/p). Then, with probability at least 1 − p, if we
run Nash Q-learning (Algorithm 1) forK episodes where
K ≥ Ω (H5SABι/ǫ2) ,
the certified policies (µˆ, νˆ) (Algorithm 2) will be ǫ-approximate Nash, i.e. V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 4 asserts that if we run the optimistic Nash Q-learning algorithm for more thanO(H5SABι/ǫ2)
episodes, the certified policies (µˆ, νˆ) extracted using Algorithm 2 will be ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium
(Definition 2).
We make two remarks. First, the executions of the certified policies µˆ, νˆ require the storage of {µkh} and
{νkh} for all k, h ∈ [H] × [K]. This makes the space complexity of our algorithm scales up linearly in the
total number of episodes K . Second, Q-learning style algorithms (especially online updates) are crucial in
our analysis for achieving sample complexity linear in S. They enjoy the property that every sample is only
been used once, on the value function that is independent of this sample. In contrast, value iteration type
algorithms do not enjoy such an independence property, which is why the best existing sample complexity
scales as S2 [2]. 3
4 Optimistic Nash V-learning
In this section, we present our new algorithm Optimistic Nash V-learning and its corresponding theoret-
ical guarantees. This algorithm improves over Nash Q-learning in sample complexity from O˜(SAB) to
O˜(S(A+B)), when only highlighting the dependency on S,A,B.
Algorithm description Nash V-learning combines the idea of Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) in
the bandit literature with the Q-learning algorithm in reinforcement learning. This algorithm does not require
extra information exchange between players other than standard game playing, thus can be ran separately
by the two players. We describe the max-player version in Algorithm 3. See Algorithm 7 in Appendix D for
the min-player version, where V h, Lh, νh, ηt and βt are defined symmetrically.
For each step in each episode, the algorithm (a) first takes action according to µh, observes the action of
the opponent, the reward, and the next state, (b) performs an incremental update on V , and (c) updates policy
µh. The first two parts are very similar to Nash Q-learning. In the third part, the agent first computes ℓh(sh, ·)
as the importance weighted estimator of the current loss. She then computes the weighted cumulative loss
Lh(sh, ·). Finally, the policy µh is updated using FTRL principle:
µh(·|sh)← argminµ∈∆A ηt〈Lh(sh, ·), µ〉 + αtKL(µ‖µ0)
3Despite [1] provides techniques to improve the sample complexity from S2 to S for value iteration inMDP, the same techniques
can not be applied to Markov games due to the unique challenge that, in Markov games, we aim at finding policies that are good
against their best responses.
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Algorithm 3 Optimistic Nash V-learning (the max-player version)
1: Initialize: for any (s, a, b, h), V h(s)← H , Lh(s, a)← 0, Nh(s)← 0, µh(a|s)← 1/A.
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: receive s1.
4: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
5: take action ah ∼ µh(·|sh), observe the action bh from opponent.
6: observe reward rh(sh, ah, bh) and next state sh+1.
7: t = Nh(sh)← Nh(sh) + 1.
8: V h(sh)← (1− αt)V h(sh) + αt(rh(sh, ah, bh) + V h+1(sh+1) + βt).
9: for all a ∈ A do
10: ℓh(sh, a)← [H − rh(sh, ah, bh)− V h+1(sh+1)]I{ah = a}/[µh(ah|sh) + ηt].
11: Lh(sh, a)← (1− αt)Lh(sh, a) + αtℓh(sh, a).
12: set µh(·|sh) ∝ exp[−(ηt/αt)Lh(sh, ·)].
Algorithm 4 Certified Policy µˆ of Nash V-learning
1: sample k ← Uniform([K]).
2: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
3: observe sh, and set t← Nkh (sh).
4: sample m ∈ [t] with P(m = i) = αit.
5: k ← kmh (sh).
6: take action ah ∼ µkh(·|sh).
Here µ0 is the uniform distribution over all actionsA. Solving above minimization problem gives the update
equation as in Line 12 in Algorithm 3. In multi-arm bandit, FTRL can defend against adversarial losses,
with regret independent of the number of the opponent’s actions. This property turns out to be crucial for
Nash V-learning to achieve sharper sample complexity than Nash Q-learning (see the analog of Lemma 3 in
Lemma 15).
Similar to Nash Q-learning, we also propose a new algorithm (Algorithm 4) to extract a certified policy
from the optimistic Nash V-learning algorithm. The certified policies are again non-Markovian. We choose
all hyperparameters as follows, for some large constant c , and log factors ι.
αt =
H + 1
H + t
, ηt =
√
logA
At
, η
t
=
√
logB
Bt
, βt = c
√
H4Aι
t
, β
t
= c
√
H4Bι
t
, (6)
We now present our main result on the sample complexity of Nash V-learning.
Theorem 5 (Sample Complexity of Nash V-learning). For any p ∈ (0, 1], choose hyperparameters as in (6)
for large absolute constant c and ι = log(SABT/p). Then, with probability at least 1 − p, if we run Nash
V-learning (Algorithm 3 and 7) for K episodes with
K ≥ Ω (H6S(A+B)ι/ǫ2) ,
its induced policies (µˆ, νˆ) (Algorithm 4) will be ǫ-approximate Nash, i.e. V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 4 claims that if we run the optimistic Nash V-learning for more than O(H6S(A + B)ι/ǫ2)
episodes, the certified policies (µˆ, νˆ) extracted from Algorithm 4 will be ǫ-approximate Nash (Definition 2).
Nash V-learning is the first algorithm of which the sample complexity matches the information theoretical
lower bound Ω(H3S(A+B)/ǫ2) up to poly(H) factors and logarithmic terms.
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5 Hardness for Learning the Best Response
In this section, we present a computational hardness result for computing the best response against an oppo-
nent with a fixed unknown policy. We further show that this implies the computational hardness result for
achieving sublinear regret in Markov games when playing against adversarial opponents, which rules out a
popular approach to design algorithms for finding Nash equilibria.
We first remark that if the opponent is restricted to only play Markov policies, then learning the best
response is as easy as learning a optimal policy in the standard single-agent Markov decision process, where
efficient algorithms are known to exist. Nevertheless, when the opponent can as well play any policy which
may be non-Markovian, we show that finding the best response against those policies is computationally
challenging.
We say an algorithm is a polynomial time algorithm for learning the best response if for any policy of the
opponent ν, and for any ǫ > 0, the algorithm finds the ǫ-approximate best response of policy ν (Definition
1) with probability at least 1/2, in time polynomial in S,H,A,B, ǫ−1.
We can show the following hardness result for finding the best response in polynomial time.
Theorem 6 (Hardness for learning the best response). There exists a Markov game with deterministic tran-
sitions and rewards defined for any horizon H ≥ 1 with S = 2, A = 2, and B = 2, such that if there
exists a polynomial time algorithm for learning the best response for this Markov game, then there exists a
polynomial time algorithm for learning parity with noise (see problem description in Appendix E).
We remark that learning parity with noise is a notoriously difficult problem that has been used to design
efficient cryptographic schemes. It is conjectured by the community to be hard.
Conjecture 7 ([16]). There is no polynomial time algorithm for learning party with noise.
Theorem 6 with Conjecture 7 demonstrates the fundamental difficulty—if not strict impossibility—of
designing a polynomial time for learning the best responses in Markov games. The intuitive reason for such
computational hardness is that, while the underlying system has Markov transitions, the opponent can play
policies that encode long-term correlations with non-Markovian nature, such as parity with noise, which
makes it very challenging to find the best response. It is known that learning many other sequential models
with long-term correlations (such as hidden Markov models or partially observable MDPs) is as hard as
learning parity with noise [20].
5.1 Hardness for Playing Against Adversarial Opponent
Theorem 6 directly implies the difficulty for achieving sublinear regret in Markov games when playing
against adversarial opponents in Markov games. Our construction of hard instances in the proof of Theorem
6 further allows the adversarial opponent to only play Markov policies in each episode. Since playing against
adversarial opponent is a different problem with independent interest, we present the full result here.
Without loss of generality, we still consider the setting where the algorithm can only control the max-
player, while the min-player is an adversarial opponent. In the beginning of every episode k, both players
pick their own policies µk and νk, and execute them throughout the episode. The adversarial opponent can
possibly pick her policy νk adaptive to all the observations in the earlier episodes.
We say an algorithm for the learner is a polynomial time no-regret algorithm if there exists a δ > 0
such that for any adversarial opponent, and any fixedK > 0, the algorithm outputs policies {µk}Kk=1 which
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satisfies the following, with probability at least 1/2, in time polynomial in S,H,A,B,K .
Regret(K) = sup
µ
K∑
k=1
V µ,ν
k
1 (s1)−
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,νk
1 (s1) ≤ poly(S,H,A,B)K1−δ (7)
Corollary 8 (Hardness for playing against adversarial opponent). There exists a Markov game with deter-
ministic transitions and rewards defined for any horizon H ≥ 1 with S = 2, A = 2, and B = 2, such that
if there exists a polynomial time no-regret algorithm for this Markov game, then there exists a polynomial
time algorithm for learning parity with noise (see problem description in Appendix E). The claim remains to
hold even if we restrict the adversarial opponents in the Markov game to be non-adaptive, and to only play
Markov policies in each episode.
Similar to Theorem 6, Corollary 8 combined with Conjecture 7 demonstrates the fundamental difficulty
of designing a polynomial time no-regret algorithm against adversarial opponents for Markov games.
Implications on algorithm design for finding Nash Equilibria Corollary 8 also rules out a natural ap-
proach for designing efficient algorithms for finding approximate Nash equilibrium through combining two
no-regret algorithms. In fact, it is not hard to see that if the min-player also runs a non-regret algorithm,
and obtain a regret bound symmetric to (7), then summing the two regret bounds shows the mixture poli-
cies (µˆ, νˆ)—which assigns uniform mixing weights to policies {µk}Kk=1 and {νk}Kk=1 respectively—is an
approximate Nash equilibrium. Corollary 8 with Conjecture 7 claims that any algorithm designed using this
approach is not a polynomial time algorithm.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we designed first line of near-optimal self-play algorithms for finding an approximate Nash
equilibrium in two-player Markov games. The sample complexity of our algorithms matches the information
theoretical lower bound up to only a polynomial factor in the length of each episode. Apart from finding
Nash equilibria, we also prove the fundamental hardness in computation for finding the best responses of
fixed opponents, as well as achieving sublinear regret against adversarial opponents, in Markov games.
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A Bellman Equations for Markov Games
In this section, we present the Bellman equations for different types of values in Markov games.
Fixed policies. For any pair of Markov policy (µ, ν), by definition of their values in (1) (2), we have the
following Bellman equations:
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
µ,ν
h+1)(s, a, b), V
µ,ν
h (s) = (Dµh×νhQ
µ,ν
h )(s)
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V µ,νH+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ SH+1.
Best responses. For any Markov policy µ of the max-player, by definition, we have the following Bellman
equations for values of its best response:
Qµ,†h (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
µ,†
h+1)(s, a, b), V
µ,†
h (s) = infν∈∆B
(Dµh×νQ
µ,†
h )(s),
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V µ,†H+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ SH+1.
Similarly, for any Markov policy ν of the min-player, we also have the following symmetric version of
Bellman equations for values of its best response:
Q†,νh (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
†,ν
h+1)(s, a, b), V
†,ν
h (s) = sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νhQ
†,ν
h )(s).
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V †,νH+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ SH+1.
Nash equilibria. Finally, by definition of Nash equilibria in Markov games, we have the following Bell-
man optimality equations:
Q⋆h(s, a, b) =(rh + PhV
⋆
h+1)(s, a, b)
V ⋆h (s) = sup
µ∈∆A
inf
ν∈∆B
(Dµ×νQ⋆h)(s) = inf
ν∈∆B
sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νQ⋆h)(s).
for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ S ×A× B × [H], where V ⋆H+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ SH+1.
B Properties of Coarse Correlated Equilibrium
Recall the definition for CCE in our main paper (4), we restate it here after rescaling. For any pair of matrix
P,Q ∈ [0, 1]n×m, the subroutine CCE(P,Q) returns a distribution π ∈ ∆n×m that satisfies:
E(a,b)∼πP (a, b) ≥max
a⋆
E(a,b)∼πP (a⋆, b) (8)
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≤min
b⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b⋆)
Wemake three remarks on CCE. First, a CCE always exists since a Nash equilibrium for a general-sum game
with payoff matrices (P,Q) is also a CCE defined by (P,Q), and a Nash equilibrium always exists. Second,
a CCE can be efficiently computed, since above constraints (8) for CCE can be rewritten as n + m linear
constraints on π ∈ ∆n×m, which can be efficiently resolved by standard linear programming algorithm.
Third, a CCE in general-sum games needs not to be a Nash equilibrium. However, a CCE in zero-sum
games is guaranteed to be a Nash equalibrium.
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Proposition 9. Let π = CCE(Q,Q), and (µ, ν) be the marginal distribution over both players’ actions
induced by π. Then (µ, ν) is a Nash equilibrium for payoff matrix Q.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let N⋆ be the value of Nash equilibrium for Q. Since π = CCE(Q,Q), by defini-
tion, we have:
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≥max
a⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a
⋆, b) = max
a⋆
Eb∼νQ(a⋆, b) ≥ N⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b) ≤min
b⋆
E(a,b)∼πQ(a, b⋆) = min
b⋆
Ea∼µQ(a, b⋆) ≤ N⋆
This gives:
max
a⋆
Eb∼νQ(a⋆, b) = min
b⋆
Ea∼µQ(a, b⋆) = N⋆
which finishes the proof.
Intuitively, a CCE procedure can be used in Nash Q-learning for finding an approximate Nash equilib-
rium, because the values of upper confidence and lower confidence—Q andQ will be eventually very close,
so that the preconditions of Proposition 9 becomes approximately satisfied.
C Proof for Nash Q-learning
In this section, we present proofs for results in Section 3.
We denote V k, Qk, πk for values and policies at the beginning of the k-th episode. We also introduce
the following short-hand notation [P̂khV ](s, a, b) := V (s
k
h+1).
We will use the following notations several times later: suppose (s, a, b) was taken at the in episodes
k1, k2, . . . at the h-th step. Since the definition of ki depends on the tuple (s, a, b) and h, we will show the
dependence explicitly by writing kih(s, a, b) when necessary and omit it when there is no confusion. We also
define Nkh (s, a, b) to be the number of times (s, a, b) has been taken at the beginning of the k-th episode.
Finally we denote nkh = N
k
h
(
skh, a
k
h, b
k
h
)
.
The following lemma is a simple consequence of the update rule in Algorithm 1, which will be used
several times later.
Lemma 10. Let t = Nkh (s, a, b) and suppose (s, a, b) was previously taken at episodes k
1, . . . , kt < k at
the h-th step. The update rule in Algorithm 1 is equivalent to the following equations.
Q
k
h(s, a, b) = α
0
tH +
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a, b) + V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1) + βi
]
(9)
Qk
h
(s, a, b) =
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a, b) + V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1)− βi
]
(10)
C.1 Learning values
We begin an auxiliary lemma. Some of the analysis in this section is adapted from [14] which studies
Q-learning under the single agent MDP setting.
Lemma 11. ([14, Lemma 4.1]) The following properties hold for αit:
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1. 1√
t
≤∑ti=1 αit√i ≤ 2√t for every t ≥ 1.
2. maxi∈[t] αit ≤ 2Ht and
∑t
i=1(α
i
t)
2 ≤ 2Ht for every t ≥ 1.
3.
∑∞
t=i α
i
t = 1 +
1
H for every i ≥ 1.
We also define β˜t := 2
∑t
i=1 α
i
tβi ≤ O(
√
H3ι/t). Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. We give the proof for one direction and the other direction is similar. For the proof of
the first claim, let t = Nkh (s, a, b) and suppose (s, a, b) was previously taken at episodes k
1, . . . , kt < k
at the h-th step. Let Fi be the σ-algebra generated by all the random variables in until the ki-th episode.
Then {αit[(P̂k
i
h − Ph)V ⋆h+1] (s, a, b)}ti=1 is a martingale differene sequence w.r.t. the filtration {Fi}ti=1. By
Azuma-Hoeffding, ∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
i=1
αit
[(
P̂
ki
h − Ph
)
V ⋆h+1
]
(s, a, b)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2H
√√√√ t∑
i=1
(
αit
)2
ι ≤ β˜t
Here we prove a stronger version of the first claim by induction: for any (s, a, b, h, k) ∈ S × A × B ×
[H]× [K],
Q
k
h(s, a, b) ≥ Q⋆h(s, a, b) ≥ Qkh(s, a, b), V kh (s) ≥ V
⋆
h (s) ≥ V kh (s).
Suppose the guarantee is true for h+ 1, then by the above concentration result,
(Q
k
h −Q⋆h)(s, a, b) ≥ α0tH +
t∑
i=1
αit
(
V
ki
h+1 − V ⋆h+1
)(
sk
i
h+1
)
and it remains to prove
(
V
ki
h+1 − V ⋆h+1
)(
sk
i
h+1
)
≥ 0. However, by the design of the algorithm
V kh+1(s) =(Dπkh+1
Qkh+1)(s) ≥ sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νk
h+1
Qkh+1)(s),
V ⋆h+1(s) ≤V †,ν
k
h+1 (s) = sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νk
h+1
Q†,ν
k
h+1)(s).
Therefore
V kh+1(s)− V ⋆h+1(s) ≥ sup
µ∈∆A
[Dµ×νk
h+1
(Qkh+1 −Q†,ν
k
h+1)](s) ≥ 0
Putting everything together, we have
(Q
k
h −Q⋆h)(s, a, b) ≥ 0
and the other direction is proved similarly.
Now we continue with the proof of the second claim. Let t = nkh and define δ
k
h :=
(
V
k
h − V kh
) (
skh
)
,
then by definition
δkh =E(a,b)∼πk
h
(
Q
k
h −Qkh
)(
skh, a, b
)
=
(
Q
k
h −Qkh
)(
skh, a
k
h, b
k
h
)
+ ζkh
(i)
= α0tH +
t∑
i=1
αitδ
ki
h
(sk
h
,ak
h
,bk
h
)
h+1 + 2β˜t + ζ
k
h
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where (i) is by taking the difference of equation (9) and equation (10) and
ζkh := E(a,b)∼πk
h
(
Q
k
h −Qkh
)(
skh, a, b
)
−
(
Q
k
h −Qkh
)(
skh, a
k
h, b
k
h
)
is a martingale difference sequence.
Taking the summation w.r.t. k, we begin with the first two terms,
K∑
k=1
α0
nk
h
H =
K∑
k=1
HI
{
nkh = 0
}
≤ SABH
K∑
k=1
nk
h∑
i=1
αi
nk
h
δ
ki
h(s
k
h
,ak
h
,bk
h)
h+1
(i)
≤
K∑
k′=1
δk
′
h+1
∞∑
i=nk
′
h
+1
α
nk
′
h
i
(ii)
≤
(
1 +
1
H
) K∑
k=1
δkh+1.
where (i) is by changing the order of summation and (ii) is by Lemma 11.
Plugging them in,
K∑
k=1
δkh ≤ SABH +
(
1 +
1
H
) K∑
k=1
δkh+1 +
K∑
k=1
(
2β˜nk
h
+ ζkh
)
.
Recursing this argument for h ∈ [H] gives
K∑
k=1
δk1 ≤ eSABH2 + 2e
H∑
h=1
K∑
k=1
β˜nk
h
+
H∑
h=1
K∑
k=1
(1 + 1/H)h−1ζkh
By pigeonhole argument,
K∑
k=1
β˜nk
h
≤ O (1)
K∑
k=1
√
H3ι
nkh
= O (1)
∑
s,a,b
NK
h
(s,a,b)∑
n=1
√
H3ι
n
≤ O
(√
H3SABKι
)
= O
(√
H2SABTι
)
By Azuma-Hoeffding,
H∑
h=1
K∑
k=1
(1 + 1/H)h−1ζkh ≤ e
√
2H3Kι = eH
√
2T ι
with high probability. The proof is completed by putting everything together.
C.2 Certified policies
Algorithm 1 only learns the value of game but itself cannot give a near optimal policy for each player. In
this section, we analyze the certified policy based on the above exploration process (Algorithm 2) and prove
the sample complexity guarantee. To this end, we need to first define a new group of policies µˆkh to facilitate
the proof , and νˆkh are defined similarly. Notice µˆ
k
h is related to µˆ defined in Algorithm 2 by µˆ =
1
k
∑k
i=1 µˆ
i
1.
We also define µˆkh+1[s, a, b] for h ≤ H − 1, which is na intermediate algorithm only involved in the
analysis. The above two policies are related by µˆkh+1 [s, a, b] =
∑t
i=1 α
i
tµˆ
k
h+1 where t = N
k
h (s, a, b).
νˆkh+1[s, a, b] is defined similarly.
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Algorithm 5 Policy µˆkh
1: Initialize: k′ ← k.
2: for step h′ = h, h + 1, . . . ,H do
3: Observe sh′ .
4: Sample ah′ ∼ µk′h (sh′).
5: Observe bh′ .
6: t← Nk′h (sh′ , ah′ , bh′).
7: Sample i from [t] with P(i) = αit.
8: k′ ← kih′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
Algorithm 6 Policy µˆkh+1[s, a, b]
1: t← Nkh (s, a, b).
2: Sample i from [t] with P(i) = αit.
3: k′ ← kih(s, a, b)
4: for step h′ = h+ 1, . . . ,H do
5: Observe sh′ .
6: Sample ah′ ∼ µk′h (sh′).
7: Observe bh′ .
8: t← Nk′h (sh′ , ah′ , bh′).
9: Sample i from [t] with P(i) = αit.
10: k′ ← kih′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
Since the policies defined in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are non-Markov, many notations for values
of Markov policies are no longer valid here. To this end, we need to define the value and Q-value of general
policies starting from step h, if the general policies starting from the h-th step do not depends the history
before the h-th step. Notice the special case h = 1 has already been covered in Section 2. For a pair of
general policy (µ, ν) which does not depend on the hostory before the h-th step, we can still use the same
definitions (1) and (2) to define their value V µ,νh (s) and Q
µ,ν
h (s, a, b) at step h. We can also define the best
response ν†(µ) of a general policy µ as the minimizing policy so that V µ,†h (s) ≡ V µ,ν
†(µ)
h (s) = infν V
µ,ν
h (s)
at step h. Similarly, we can define Qµ,†h (s, a, b) ≡ Q
µ,ν†(µ)
h (s, a, b) = infν Q
µ,ν
h (s, a, b). As before, the best
reponse of a general policy is not necessarily Markovian.
It should be clear from the definition of Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 that µˆkh, νˆ
k
h , µˆ
k
h+1[s, a, b] and
νˆkh+1[s, a, b] does not depend on the history before step h, therefore related value and Q-value functions are
well defined for the corresponding steps. Now we can show the policies defined above are indeed certified.
Lemma 12. For any p ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − p, the following holds for any (s, a, b, h, k) ∈
S ×A× B × [H]× [K],
Q
k
h(s, a, b) ≥ Q
†,νˆk
h+1
[s,a,b]
h (s, a, b), V
k
h(s) ≥ V †,νˆ
k
h
h (s)
Qk
h
(s, a, b) ≤ Qµˆ
k
h+1
[s,a,b],†
h (s, a, b), V
k
h(s) ≤ V
µˆk
h
,†
h (s)
19
Proof of Lemma 12. We first prove this for h = H .
Q
k
H(s, a, b) =α
0
tH +
t∑
i=1
αit [rH(s, a, b) + βi]
≥rH(s, a, b) = Q†,νˆ
k
H+1
H (s, a, b)
because H is the last step and
V
k
H(s) =(Dπk
H
Q
k
H)(s) ≥ sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νk
H
Q
k
H)(s)
≥ sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νk
H
rH)(s) = V
†,νkH
H (s) = V
†,νˆkH
H (s)
because πkH is CCE, and by definition νˆ
k
H = ν
k
H .
Now suppose the claim is true for h + 1, consider the h case. Consider a fixed tuple (s, a, b) and let
t = Nkh (s, a, b). Suppose (s, a, b) was previously taken at episodes k
1, . . . , kt < k at the h-th step. Let Fi
be the σ-algebra generated by all the random variables in until the ki-th episode. Then {αit[rh(s, a, b) +
V
†,νˆki
h+1
h+1 (s
ki
h+1) + βi]}ti=1 is a martingale differene sequence w.r.t. the filtration {Fi}ti=1. By Azuma-
Hoeffding and the definition of bi,
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a, b) + V
†,νˆki
h+1
h+1 (s
ki
h+1) + βi
]
≥
t∑
i=1
αitQ
†,νˆki
h+1
h (s, a, b)
with high probability. Combining this with the induction hypothesis,
Q
k
h(s, a, b) =α
0
tH +
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a, b) + V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1) + βi
]
≥
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a, b) + V
†,νˆki
h+1
h+1 (s
ki
h+1) + βi
]
≥
t∑
i=1
αitQ
†,νˆki
h+1
h (s, a, b)
(i)
≥max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitQ
µ,νˆk
i
h+1
h (s, a, b) = Q
†,νˆk
h+1
[s,a,b]
h (s, a, b)
where we have taken the maximum operator out of the summation in (i),which does not increase the sum.
On the other hand,
V
k
h(s) =(Dπk
h
Q
k
h)(s)
(i)
≥ sup
µ∈∆A
(Dµ×νk
h
Q
k
h)(s)
(ii)
≥ max
a∈A
Eb∼νk
h
Q
†,νˆk
h+1
[s,a,b]
h (s, a, b) = V
†,νˆk
h
h (s)
where (i) is by the definition of CCE and (ii) is the induction hypothesis. The other direction is proved by
performing smilar arguments on Qk
h
(s, a, b), Q
µˆk
h+1
[s,a,b],†
h (s, a, b), V
k
h(s) and V
µˆk
h
,†
h (s).
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Finally we give the theoretical guarantee of the policies defined above.
Proof of Theorem 4. By lemma 12, we have
K∑
k=1
(
V
†,νˆk
1
1 − V
µˆk
1
,†
1
)
(s1) ≤
K∑
k=1
(
V
k
1 − V k1
)
(s1)
and Lemma 3 upper bounds this quantity by
K∑
k=1
(
V
†,νˆk1
1 − V
µˆk1 ,†
1
)
(s1) ≤ O
(√
H4SABTι
)
By definition of the induced policy, with probability at least 1 − p, if we run Nash Q-learning (Algo-
rithm 1) for K episodes with
K ≥ Ω
(
H5SABι
ǫ2
)
,
its induced policies (µˆ, νˆ) (Algorithm 2) will be ǫ-optimal in the sense V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
D Proof for Nash V-learning
In this section, we present proofs of the results in Section 4. We denote V k, µk, νk for values and policies
at the beginning of the k-th episode. We also introduce the following short-hand notation [P̂khV ](s, a, b) :=
V (skh+1).
We will use the following notations several times later: suppose the state s was visited at episodes
k1, k2, . . . at the h-th step. Since the definition of ki depends on the state s , we will show the dependence
explicitly by writing kih(s) when necessary and omit it when there is no confusion. We also define N
k
h (s) to
be the number of times the state s has been visited at the beginning of the k-th episode. Finally we denote
nkh = N
k
h
(
skh
)
. Notice the definitions here are different from that in Appendix C.
The following lemma is a simple consequence of the update rule in Algorithm 3, which will be used
several times later.
Lemma 13. Let t = Nkh (s) and suppose s was previously visited at episodes k
1, . . . , kt < k at the h-th
step. The update rule in Algorithm 3 is equivalent to the following equations.
V
k
h(s) = α
0
tH +
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a
ki
h , b
ki
h ) + V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1) + βi
]
(11)
V kh(s) =
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a
ki
h
h , b
ki
h
h ) + V
ki
h
h+1(s
ki
h
h+1) + βi
]
(12)
D.1 Missing algorithm details
We first give Algorithm 7: the min-player counterpart of Algorithm 3. Almost everything is symmetric
except the definition of loss function to keep it non-negative.
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Algorithm 7 Optimistic Nash V-learning (the min-player version)
1: Initialize: for any (s, a, b, h), V h(s)← 0, Lh(s, b)← 0, Nh(s)← 0, νh(b|s)← 1/B.
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: receive s1.
4: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
5: take action bh ∼ νh(·|sh), observe the action ah from opponent
6: observe reward rh(sh, ah, bh) and next state sh+1.
7: t = Nh(sh)← Nh(sh) + 1.
8: V h(sh)← (1− αt)V h(sh) + αt(rh(sh, ah, bh) + V h+1(sh+1)− βt)
9: for all b ∈ B do
10: ℓh(sh, b)← [rh(sh, ah, bh) + V h+1(sh+1)]I{bh = b}/[νh(bh|sh) + ηt].
11: Lh(sh, b)← (1− αt)Lh(sh, b) + αtℓh(sh, b).
12: set νh(·|sh) ∝ exp[−(ηt/αt)Lh(sh, ·)].
D.2 Learning values
As usual, we begin with learning the value V ⋆ of the Markov game. We begin with an auxiliary lemma,
which justifies our choice of confidence bound.
Lemma 14. Let t = Nkh (s) and suppose state s was previously taken at episodes k
1, . . . , kt < k at the h-th
step. Choosing ηt =
√
logA
At and ηt =
√
logB
Bt , with probability 1 − p, for any (s, h, t) ∈ S × [H] × [K],
there exist a constant c s.t.
max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitDµ×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
ki
h+1
)
(s)−
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh
(
s, ak
i
h , b
ki
h
)
+ V
ki
h+1
(
sk
i
h+1
)]
≤ c
√
2H4Aι/t
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh
(
s, ak
i
h , b
ki
h
)
+ V k
i
h+1
(
sk
i
h+1
)]
−min
ν
t∑
i=1
αitDµki
h
×ν
(
rh + PhV
ki
h+1
)
(s) ≤ c
√
2H4Bι/t
Proof of Lemma 14. We prove the first inequality. The proof for the second inequality is similar. We con-
sider thoughout the proof a fixed (s, h, t) ∈ S × [H] × [K]. Define Fi as the σ-algebra generated by all
the random variables before the kih-th episode. Then {rh(s, ak
i
h , b
ki
h ) + V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1)}ti=1 is a martingale
sequence w.r.t. the filtration {Fi}ti=1. By Azuma-Hoeffding,
t∑
i=1
αitDµki
h
×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
ki
h+1
)
(s)−
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh
(
s, ak
i
h , b
ki
h
)
+ V
ki
h+1
(
sk
i
h+1
)]
≤ 2
√
H3ι/t
So we only need to bound
max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitDµ×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
ki
h+1
)
(s)−
t∑
i=1
αitDµki
h
×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
ki
h+1
)
(s) := R⋆t (13)
where R⋆t is the weighted regret in the first t times of visiting state s, with respect to the optimal policy in
hindsight, in the following adversarial bandit problem. The loss function is defined by
li(a) = Eb∼νki
h
(s)
{H − h+ 1− rh (s, a, b)− PhV k
i
h+1 (s, a, b)}
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with weight wi = α
i
t. We note the weighted regret can be rewrite as R
⋆
t =
∑t
i=1wi
〈
µ⋆h − µkih , li
〉
where
µ⋆h is argmax for (13), and the loss function satisfies li(a) ∈ [0,H]
Therefore, Algorithm 3 is essentially performing follow the regularized leader (FTRL) algorithm with
changing step size for each state to solve this adversarial bandit problem. The policy we are using is
µk
i
h (s, a) and the optimistic biased estimator
lˆi(a) =
H − h+ 1− rh(skih , ak
i
h , b
ki
h )− V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1)
µk
i
h (s, a) + ηi
· I
{
ak
i
h = a
}
is used to handle the bandit feedback.
A more detailed discussion on how to solve the weighted adversarial bandit problem is included in
Appendix F. Note that wi = α
i
t is monotonic inscreasing, i.e. maxi≤twi = wt. By Lemma 17, we have
R⋆t ≤ 2Hαtt
√
Atι+
3H
√
Aι
2
t∑
i=1
αit√
i
+
1
2
Hαttι+H
√√√√2ι t∑
i=1
(
αit
)2
≤ 4H2
√
Aι/t+ 3H
√
Aι/t+H2ι/t+
√
4H3ι/t
≤ 10H2
√
Aι/t
with probability 1− p/(SHK). Finally by a union bound over all (s, h, t) ∈ S × [H]× [K], we finish the
proof.
We now prove the following Lemma 15, which is an analoge of Lemma 3 in Nash Q-learning.
Lemma 15. For any p ∈ (0, 1], choose hyperparameters as in (6) for large absolute constant c and ι =
log(SABT/p). Then, with probability at least 1 − p, Algorithm 3 and 7 will jointly provide the following
guarantees
• V kh(s) ≥ V ⋆h (s) ≥ V kh(s) for all (s, h, k) ∈ S × [K]× [H].
• (1/K) ·∑Kk=1(V k1 − V k1)(s1) ≤ O(√H6S(A+B)ι/K).
Proof of Lemma 15. We proof the first claim by backward induction. The claim is true for h = H + 1.
Asumme for any s, V
k
h+1(s) ≥ V ⋆h+1 (s), V kh+1(s) ≤ V ⋆h+1 (s). For a fixed (s, h) ∈ S × [H] and episode
k ∈ [K], let t = Nkh (s) and suppose s was previously visited at episodes k1, . . . , kt < k at the h-th step.
By Bellman equation,
V ⋆h (s) =maxµ
min
ν
Dµ×ν
(
rh + PhV
⋆
h+1
)
(s)
=max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitminν
Dµ×ν
(
rh + PhV
⋆
h+1
)
(s)
≤max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitDµ×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
⋆
h+1
)
(s)
≤max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitDµ×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
ki
h+1
)
(s)
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Comparing with the decomposition of V
k
h(s) in Equation (11) and use Lemma 14, we can see if βt =
c
√
AH4ι/t, then V
k
h(s) ≥ V ⋆h (s). Similar by taking βt = c
√
BH4ι/t, we also have V kh(s) ≤ V ⋆h (s).
The second cliam is to bound δkh := V
k
h(s
k
h) − V kh(skh) ≥ 0. Similar to what we have done in Nash
Q-learning analysis, taking the difference of Equation (11) and Equation (12),
δkh =V
k
h(s
k
h)− V kh(skh)
=α0
nk
h
H +
nk
h∑
i=1
αi
nk
h
[(
V
ki
h
(sk
h
)
h+1 − V
ki
h
(sk
h
)
h+1
)(
s
ki
h
(sk
h
)
h+1
)
+ βi + βi
]
=α0
nk
h
H +
nk
h∑
i=1
αi
nk
h
δ
ki
h
(sk
h
)
h+1 + β˜nkh
where
β˜j :=
j∑
i=1
αij(bi + bi) ≤ c
√
(A+B)H4ι/j.
Taking the summation w.r.t. k, we begin with the first two terms,
K∑
k=1
α0
nk
h
H =
K∑
k=1
HI
{
nkh = 0
}
≤ SH
K∑
k=1
nk
h∑
i=1
αi
nk
h
δ
ki
h(s
k
h)
h+1
(i)
≤
K∑
k′=1
δk
′
h+1
∞∑
i=nk
′
h
+1
α
nk
′
h
i
(ii)
≤
(
1 +
1
H
) K∑
k=1
δkh+1.
where (i) is by changing the order of summation and (ii) is by Lemma 11. Putting them together,
K∑
k=1
δkh =
K∑
k=1
α0
nk
h
H +
K∑
k=1
nk
h∑
i=1
αi
nk
h
δ
ki
h(s
k
h)
h+1 +
K∑
k=1
β˜nk
h
≤HS +
(
1 +
1
H
) K∑
k=1
δkh+1 +
K∑
k=1
β˜nk
h
Recursing this argument for h ∈ [H] gives
K∑
k=1
δk1 ≤ eSH2 + e
H∑
h=1
K∑
k=1
β˜nk
h
By pigeonhole argument,
K∑
k=1
β˜nk
h
≤ O (1)
K∑
k=1
√
(A+B)H4ι
nkh
= O (1)
∑
s
nK
h
(s)∑
n=1
√
(A+B)H4ι
n
≤ O
(√
H4S(A+B)Kι
)
= O
(√
H3S(A+B)T ι
)
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Algorithm 8 Policy µˆkh
1: sample k ← Uniform([K]).
2: for step h′ = h, h + 1, . . . ,H do
3: observe sh′, and set t← Nkh′(sh′).
4: sample m ∈ [t] with P(m = i) = αit.
5: k ← kmh′ (sh′).
6: take action ah′ ∼ µkh′(·|sh′).
Expanding this formula repeatedly and apply pigeonhole argument we have
K∑
k=1
[V
k
h − V kh](s1) ≤ O(
√
H5S(A+B)T ι).
which finishes the proof.
D.3 Certified policies
As before, we construct a series of new policies µˆkh in Algorithm 8. Notice µˆ
k
h is related to µˆ defined in
Algorithm 4 by µˆ = 1k
∑k
i=1 µˆ
i
1. Also we need to consider value and Q-value functions of general policies
which does not depend on the hostory before the h-th step. See Appendix C.2 for details. Again, we can
show the policies defined above are indeed certified.
Lemma 16. For any p ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − p, the following holds for any (s, a, b, h, k) ∈
S ×A× B × [H]× [K],
V
k
h(s) ≥ V †,νˆ
k
h
h (s), V
k
h(s) ≤ V
µˆk
h
,†
h (s)
Proof of Lemma 16. We prove one side by induction and the other side is similar. The claim is trivially
satisfied for h = H + 1. Suppose it is ture for h+ 1, consider a fixed state s. Let t = Nkh (s) and suppose s
was previously visited at episodes k1, . . . , kt < k at the h-th step. Then using Lemma 13,
V
k
h(s) = α
0
tH +
t∑
i=1
αit
[
rh(s, a
ki
h , b
ki
h
h ) + V
ki
h+1(s
ki
h+1) + βi
]
(i)
≥ max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitDµ×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
ki
h+1
)
(s)
(ii)
≥ max
µ
t∑
i=1
αitDµ×νki
h
(
rh + PhV
†,νˆki
h+1
h+1
)
(s)
= V
†,νˆk
h
h (s)
where (i) is by using Lemma 14 and the definition of βi, and (ii) is by induction hypothesis.
Equipped with the above lemmas, we are now ready to prove Theorem 5.
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Proof of Theorem 5. By lemma 16, we have
K∑
k=1
(
V
†,νˆk1
1 − V
µˆk1 ,†
1
)
(s1) ≤
K∑
k=1
(
V
k
1 − V k1
)
(s1)
and Lemma 15 upper bounds this quantity by
K∑
k=1
(
V
†,νˆk
1
1 − V
µˆk
1
,†
1
)
(s1) ≤ O
(√
H5S(A+B)T ι
)
By definition of the induced policy, with probability at least 1 − p, if we run Nash V-learning (Algo-
rithm 3) for K episodes with
K ≥ Ω
(
H6S(A+B)ι
ǫ2
)
,
its induced policies (µˆ, νˆ) (Algorithm 4) will be ǫ-optimal in the sense V †,νˆ1 (s1)− V µˆ,†1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
E Proofs of Hardness for Learning the Best Responses
In this section we give the proof of Theorem 6, and Corollary 8. Our proof is inspired by a computational
hardness result for adversarial MDPs in [36, Section 4.2], which constructs a family of adversarial MDPs
that are computationally as hard as an agnostic parity learning problem.
Section E.1, E.2, E.3 will be devoted to prove Theorem 6, while Corollary 8 is proved in Section E.4.
Towards proving Theorem 6, we will:
• (Section E.1) Construct a Markov game.
• (Section E.2) Define a series of problems where a solution in problem implies another.
• (Section E.3) Based on the believed computational hardness of learning paries with noise (Conjec-
ture 7), we conclude that finding the best response of non-Markov policies is computationally hard.
E.1 Markov game construction
We now describe a Markov game inspired the adversarial MDP in [36, Section 4.2]. We define a Markov
game in which we have 2H states, {i0, i1}Hi=2, 10 (the initial state) and ⊥ (the terminal state)4. In each state
the max-player has two actions a0 and a1, while the min-player has two actions b0 and b1. The transition
kernel is deterministic and the next state for steps h ≤ H − 1 is defined in Table 2:
State/Action (a0, b0) (a0, b1) (a1, b0) (a1, b1)
i0 (i+ 1)0 (i+ 1)0 (i+ 1)0 (i+ 1)1
i1 (i+ 1)1 (i+ 1)0 (i+ 1)1 (i+ 1)1
Table 2: Transition kernel of the hard instance.
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State/Action (·, b0) (·, b1)
H0 1 0
H1 0 1
Table 3: Reward of the hard instance.
At the H-th step, i.e. states H0 and H1, the next state is always ⊥ regardless of the action chosen by
both players. The reward function is always 0 except at the H-th step. The reward is determined by the
action of the min-player, defined by
At the beginning of every episode k, both players pick their own policies µk and νk, and execute them
throughout the episode. The min-player can possibly pick her policy νk adaptive to all the observations in
the earlier episodes. The only difference from the standard Markov game protocol is that the actions of the
min-player except the last step will be revealed at the beginning of each episode, to match the setting in
agnostic learning parities (Problem 2 below). Therefore we are actually considering a easier problem (for
the max-player) and the lower bound naturally applies.
E.2 A series of computationally hard problems
We first introduce a series of problems and then show how the reduction works.
Problem 1 The max-player ǫ-approximates the best reponse for any general policy ν in the Markov game
defined in Appendix E.1 with probability at least 1/2, in poly(H, 1/ǫ) time.
Problem 2 Let x = (x1, · · · , xn) be a vector in {0,1}n, T ⊆ [n] and 0 < α < 1/2.The parity of x on T
is the boolean function φT (x) = ⊕i∈Txi. In words, φT (x) outputs 0 if the number of ones in the subvector
(xi)i∈T is even and 1 otherwise. A uniform query oracle for this problem is a randomized algorithm that
returns a random uniform vector x, as well as a noisy classification f(x) which is equal to φT (x) w.p. α
and 1 − φT (x) w.p. 1 − α. All examples returned by the oracle are independent. The learning parity with
noise problem consists in designing an algorithm with access to the oracle such that,
• (Problem 2.1) w.p at least 1/2, find a (possibly random) function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisy
EhPx[h(x) 6= φT (x)] ≤ ǫ, in poly(n, 1/ǫ) time.
• (Problem 2.2) w.p at least 1/4, find h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisy Px[h(x) 6= φT (x)] ≤ ǫ, in
poly(n, 1/ǫ) time.
• (Problem 2.3) w.p at least 1 − p, find h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisy Px[h(x) 6= φT (x)] ≤ ǫ, in
poly(n, 1/ǫ, 1/p) time.
We remark that Problem 2.3 is the formal definition of learning parity with noise [20, Definition 2],
which is conjectured to be computationally hard in the community (see also Conjecture 7).
4In [36] the states are denoted by {ia, ib}
H
i=2 instead. Here we slightly change the notation to make it different from the notation
of the actions
27
Problem 2.3 reduces to Problem 2.2 Step 1: Repeatly apply algorithm for Problem 2.2 ℓ times to
get h1, . . . , hℓ such that mini Px[hi(x) 6= φT (x)] ≤ ǫ with probability at least 1 − (3/4)ℓ. This costs
poly(n, ℓ, 1/ǫ) time. Let i⋆ = argmini erri where erri = Px[hi(x) 6= φT (x)].
Step 2: Construct estimators using N additional data (x(j), y(j))
N
j=1,
eˆrri :=
1
N
∑N
j=1 I{hi(x(j)) 6= y(j)} − α
1− 2α .
Pick iˆ = argmini eˆrri. When N ≥ log(1/p)/ǫ2, with probability at least 1− p/2, we have
max
i
|eˆrri − erri| ≤ ǫ
1− 2α.
This means that
errˆi ≤ eˆrrˆi +
ǫ
1− 2α ≤ eˆrri⋆ +
ǫ
1− 2α ≤ erri⋆ +
2ǫ
1− 2α ≤ O(1)ǫ.
This step uses poly(n,N, ℓ) = poly(n, 1/ǫ, log(1/p), ℓ) time.
Step 3: Pick ℓ = log(1/p), we are guaranteed that good events in step 1 and step 2 happen with
probability ≥ 1 − p/2 and altogether happen with probability at least 1 − p. The total time used is
poly(n, 1/ǫ, log(1/p)). Note better dependence on p than required.
Problem 2.2 reduces to Problem 2.1: If we have an algorithm that gives Eh∼DPx[h(x) 6= φT (x)] ≤ ǫ
with probability 1/2. Then if we sample hˆ ∼ D, by Markov’s inequality, we have with probability ≥ 1/4
that
Px[hˆ(x) 6= φT (x)] ≤ 2ǫ
Problem 2.1 reduces to Problem 1: Consider the Markov game constructed above withH − 1 = n. The
only missing piece we fill up here is the policy ν of the min-player, which is constructed as following. The
min-player draws a sample (x, y) from the uniform query oracle, then taking action b0 at the step h ≤ H−1
if xh = 0 and b1 otherwise. For theH-th step, the min-player take action b0 if y = 0 and b1 otherwise. Also
notice the policy µˆ of the max-player can be descibed by a set Tˆ ⊆ [H] where he takes action a1 at step h
if h and a0 otherwise. As a result, the max-player receive non-zero result iff φTˆ (x) = y.
In the Markov game, we have V µˆ,ν1 (s1) = P(φTˆ (x) = y). As a result, the optimal policy µ
∗ corresponds
to the true parity set T . As a result,
(V †,ν1 − V µˆ,ν1 )(s1) = Px,y(φT (x) = y)− Px,y(φTˆ (x) = y) ≤ ǫ
by the ǫ-approximation guarantee.
Also notice
Px,y(φTˆ (x) 6= y)− Px,y(φT (x) 6= y) =(1− α)Px(φTˆ (x) 6= φT (x)) + αPx(φTˆ (x) = φT (x)) − α
=(1− 2α)Px(φTˆ (x) 6= φT (x))
This implies:
Px(φTˆ (x) 6= φT (x)) ≤
ǫ
1− 2α
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E.3 Putting them together
So far, we have proved that Solving Problem 1 implies solving Problem 2.3, where Problem 1 is the problem
of learning ǫ-approximate best response in Markov games (the problem we are interested in), and Problem
2.3 is precisely the problem of learning parity with noise [20]. This concludes the proof.
E.4 Proofs of Hardness Against Adversarial Opponents
Corollary 8 is a direct consequence of Theorem 6, as we will show now.
Proof of Corollary 8. We only need to prove a polynomial time no-regret algorithm also learns the best
response in a Markov game where the min-player following non-Markov policy ν. Then the no-regret
guarantee implies,
V †,ν1 (s1)−
1
K
K∑
k=1
V µ
k,ν
1 (s1) ≤ poly(S,H,A,B)K−δ
where µk is the policy of the max-player in the k-th episode. If we choose µˆ uniformly randomly from
{µk}Kk=1, then
V †,ν1 (s1)− V µˆ,ν1 (s1) ≤ poly(S,H,A,B)K−δ .
Choosing ǫ = poly(S,H,A,B)K−δ ,K = poly(S,H,A,B, 1/ǫ) and the running time of the no-regret
algorithm is still poly(S,H,A,B, 1/ǫ) to learn the ǫ-approximate best response.
To see that the Corollary 8 remains to hold for policies that are Markovian in each episode and non-
adaptive, we can take the hard instance in Theorem 6 and let νk denote the min-player’s policy in the k-th
episode. Note that each νk is Markovian and non-adaptive on the observations in previous episodes. If there
is a polynomial time no-regret algorithm against such
{
νk
}
, then by the online-to-batch conversion similar
as the above, the mixture of {µk}Kk=1 learns a best response against ν in polynomial time.
F Auxiliary Lemmas for Weighted Adversarial Bandit
In this section, we formulate the bandit problem we reduced to in the proof of Lemma 14. Although the
machnisms are already well understood, we did not find a good reference of Follow the Regularized Leader
(FTRL) algorithm with
1. changing step size
2. weighted regret
3. high probability regret bound
For completeness, we give the detailed derivation here.
We assume l˜i ∈ [0, 1]A and Eil˜i = li. Define A = |A|, we set the hyperparameters by
ηt = γt =
√
logA
At
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Algorithm 9 FTRL for Weighted Regret with Changing Step Size
1: for episode t = 1, . . . ,K do
2: θt(a) ∝ exp[−(ηt/wt) ·
∑t−1
i=1 wilˆi(a)]
3: Take action at ∼ θt(·), and observe loss l˜t(at).
4: lˆt(a)← l˜t(a)I{at = a}/(θt(a) + γt) for all a ∈ A.
Define the filtration Ft by the σ-algebra generated by {ai, li}t−1i=1. Then the regret can be defined as
Rt (θ
∗) :=
t∑
i=1
wiEa∼θ∗ [li(a)− li(ai)|Fi] =
t∑
i=1
wi 〈θi − θ∗, li〉
We can easily check the definitions here is just an abstract version of that in the proof of Lemma 14 with
rescaling. To state the regret guarantee, we also define ι = log(p/AK) for any p ∈ (0, 1]. Now we can
upper bound the regret by
Lemma 17. Following Algorithm 9, with probability 1− 3p, for any θ∗ ∈ ∆A and t ≤ K we have
Rt (θ
∗) ≤ 2max
i≤t
wi
√
Atι+
3
√
Aι
2
t∑
i=1
wi√
i
+
1
2
max
i≤t
wiι+
√√√√2ι t∑
i=1
w2i
Proof. The regret Rt(θ
∗) can be decomposed into three terms
Rt (θ
∗) =
t∑
i=1
wi 〈θi − θ∗, li〉
=
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi − θ∗, lˆi
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi, li − lˆi
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θ∗, lˆi − li
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
and we bound (A) in Lemma 19, (B) in Lemma 20 and (C) in Lemma 21.
Setting ηt = γt =
√
logA
At , the conditions in Lemma 19 and Lemma 21 are satisfied. Putting them
together and take union bound, we have with probability 1− 3p
Rt (θ
∗) ≤wt logA
ηt
+
A
2
t∑
i=1
ηiwi +
1
2
max
i≤t
wiι+A
t∑
i=1
γiwi +
√√√√2ι t∑
i=1
w2i +maxi≤t
wiι/γt
≤2max
i≤t
wi
√
Atι+
3
√
Aι
2
t∑
i=1
wi√
i
+
1
2
max
i≤t
wiι+
√√√√2ι t∑
i=1
w2i
The rest of this section is devoted to the proofs of the Lemmas used in the proofs of Lemma 17. We
begin the following useful lemma adapted from Lemma 1 in [21], which is crucial in constructing high
probability guarantees.
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Lemma 18. For any sequence of coefficients c1, c2, . . . , ct s.t. ci ∈ [0, 2γi]A is Fi-measurable, we have
with probability 1− p/AK,
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
ci, lˆi − li
〉
≤ max
i≤t
wiι
Proof. Define w = maxi≤t wi. By definition,
wilˆi (a) =
wil˜i (a) I {ai = a}
θi (a) + γi
≤ wil˜i (a) I {ai = a}
θi (a) +
wi l˜i(a)I{ai=a}
w γi
=
w
2γi
2γiwi l˜i(a)I{ai=a}
wθi(a)
1 + γiwi l˜i(a)I{ai=a}wθi(a)
(i)
≤ w
2γi
log
(
1 +
2γiwil˜i (a) I {ai = a}
wθi (a)
)
where (i) is because z1+z/2 ≤ log (1 + z) for all z ≥ 0.
Defining the sum
Sˆi =
wi
w
〈
ci, lˆi
〉
, Si =
wi
w
〈ci, li〉 ,
we have
Ei
[
exp
(
Sˆi
)]
≤ Ei
[
exp
(∑
a
ci (a)
2γi
log
(
1 +
2γiwil˜i (a) I {ai = a}
wθi (a)
))]
(i)
≤ Ei
[∏
a
(
1 +
ci (a)wil˜i (a) I {ai = a}
wθi (a)
)]
= Ei
[
1 +
∑
a
ci (a)wil˜i (a) I {ai = a}
wθi (a)
]
= 1 + Si ≤ exp (Si)
where (i) is because z1 log (1 + z2) ≤ log (1 + z1z2) for any 0 ≤ z1 ≥ 1 and z2 ≥ −1. Here we are using
the condition ci (a) ≤ 2γi to guarantee the condition is satisfied.
Equipped with the above bound, we can now prove the concentration result.
P
[
t∑
i=1
(
Sˆi − Si
)
≥ ι
]
= P
[
exp
[
t∑
i=1
(
Sˆi − Si
)]
≥ AK
p
]
≤ p
AK
Et
[
exp
[
t∑
i=1
(
Sˆi − Si
)]]
≤ p
AK
Et−1
[
exp
[
t−1∑
i=1
(
Sˆi − Si
)]
Et
[
exp
(
Sˆt − St
)]]
≤ p
AK
Et−1
[
exp
[
t−1∑
i=1
(
Sˆi − Si
)]]
≤ · · · ≤ p
AK
The claim is proved by taking the union bound.
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Using Lemma 18, we can bound the (A)(B)(C) separately as below.
Lemma 19. If ηi ≤ 2γi for all i ≤ t, with probability 1− p, for any t ∈ [K] and θ∗ ∈ ∆A,
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi − θ∗, lˆi
〉
≤ wt logA
ηt
+
A
2
t∑
i=1
ηiwi +
1
2
max
i≤t
wiι
Proof. We use the standard analysis of FTRL with changing step size, see for example Exercise 28.13 in
[17]. Notice the essential step size is ηt/wt,
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi − θ∗, lˆi
〉
≤ wt logA
ηt
+
1
2
t∑
i=1
ηiwi
〈
θi, lˆ
2
i
〉
≤ wt logA
ηt
+
1
2
t∑
i=1
∑
a∈A
ηiwilˆi (a)
(i)
≤ wt logA
ηt
+
1
2
t∑
i=1
∑
a∈A
ηiwili (a) +
1
2
max
i≤t
wiι
≤ wt logA
ηt
+
A
2
t∑
i=1
ηiwi +
1
2
max
i≤t
wiι
where (i) is by using Lemma 18 with ci(a) = ηi. The any-time guarantee is justifed by taking union
bound.
Lemma 20. With probability 1− p, for any t ∈ [K],
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi, li − lˆi
〉
≤ A
t∑
i=1
γiwi +
√√√√2ι t∑
i=1
w2i
Proof. We further decopose it into
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi, li − lˆi
〉
=
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi, li − Eilˆi
〉
+
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi,Eilˆi − lˆi
〉
The first term is bounded by
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi, li − Eilˆi
〉
=
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi, li − θi
θi + γi
li
〉
=
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θi,
γi
θi + γi
li
〉
≤ A
t∑
i=1
γiwi
To bound the second term, notice〈
θi, lˆi
〉
≤
∑
a∈A
θi (a)
I {at = a}
θi(a) + γi
≤
∑
a∈A
I {ai = a} = 1,
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thus {wi
〈
θi,Ei lˆi − lˆi
〉
}ti=1 is a bounded martingale difference sequence w.r.t. the filtration {Fi}ti=1. By
Azuma-Hoeffding,
t∑
i=1
〈
θi,Eilˆi − lˆi
〉
≤
√√√√2ι t∑
i=1
w2i
Lemma 21. With probability 1− p, for any t ∈ [K] and any θ∗ ∈ ∆A, if γi is non-increasing in i,
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θ∗, lˆi − li
〉
≤ max
i≤t
wiι/γt
Proof. Define a basis {ej}Aj=1 of RA by
ej (a) =
{
1 if a = j
0 otherwise
Then for all the j ∈ [A], apply Lemma 18 with ci = γtej . Sine now ci(a) ≤ γt ≤ γi, the condition in
Lemma 18 is satisfied. As a result,
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
ej , lˆi − li
〉
≤ max
i≤t
wiι/γt
Since any θ∗ is a convex combination of {ej}Aj=1, by taking the union bound over j ∈ [A], we have
t∑
i=1
wi
〈
θ∗, lˆi − li
〉
≤ max
i≤t
wiι/γt
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